ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ†
INTRODUCTION
My work in the economics of innovation began some forty years
ago. I realized, as I was beginning my work on the Economics of
Information, that knowledge and information are very similar.1 In
fact, you can view information as a particular kind of knowledge, and
so the problems that I was analyzing at the time, such as how well the
market economy deals with information, corresponded to the
question of how well the market economy deals with knowledge. My
work showed that the standard paradigm (the neoclassical model,
which argued that well-functioning markets solved all economic
problems) just did not work when information was imperfect and
endogenous (that is, could be affected by what individuals or firms
did), and, by extension, when knowledge is endogenous (that is, when
technology is changing). Adam Smith’s theory argued that individuals
in pursuit of their self-interest (firms in pursuit of maximizing profits)
were led as if by an invisible hand to the general well-being of
society.2 One of the important results of my work, developed in a
number of my papers, was that the invisible hand often seemed
3
invisible because it was not there.

Copyright © 2008 by Joseph E. Stiglitz.
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1. See J.E. Stiglitz, Information and Economic Analysis, in CURRENT ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS 27, 27–28 (J.M. Parkin & A.R. Nobay eds., 1975).
2. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1937) (1776).
3. E.g., Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies with
Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 QUART. J. ECON. 229, 230 (1986) (providing
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This led me to a certain degree of skepticism about the standard
perspectives on intellectual property. When I was at the Council of
4
Economic Advisors we opposed the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPS), part of the Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations. Interestingly, so did the Office of
Science and Technology Policy. We were not alone in our opposition;
indeed, it was a view held by many, if not most, of the people who
understood the issues. These views stood in contrast to the views of
most of the people who had some special interest on this issue,
particularly from the pharmaceutical and entertainment industries,
who argued that the stronger the intellectual property rights the
better. When I went to the World Bank,5 I continued to be involved in
the issue. We had concluded that what separates developed and
developing countries is not just the disparity, the gap, in resources,
but also the disparity in knowledge, and closing that gap in knowledge
is an essential part of successful development. We had become
concerned that TRIPS might make access to knowledge more
difficult—and thus make closing the knowledge gap, and
development more generally, more difficult. We also worried about
the effects of TRIPS on access to life-saving medicines; TRIPS
attempted (successfully) to restrict access to generic medicines,
putting these drugs out of the financial reach of most in the
developing countries. The World Bank has an annual report called
the World Development Report, which highlights a key development
issue every year. During the first year I was at the World Bank, we
focused on the problems of knowledge for development.6 That year’s
report argued that TRIPS imposed an unbalanced intellectual
7
property regime.

the basic theoretic analysis showing that markets with incomplete risk markets and imperfect
information are not (constrained) Pareto optimal, that is, taking into account the costs of
obtaining information or creating markets, there are government interventions that can make
some individuals better off without making anyone else worse off); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The
Invisible Hand and Modern Welfare Economics, in INFORMATION STRATEGY AND PUBLIC
POLICY 12, 15 (David Vines & Andrew Stevenson eds., 1991).
4. I served as a member of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers from 1993
to 1997, and chairman and a member of the cabinet from 1995 to 1997.
5. I served as its chief economist and senior vice president from 1997 to 2000.
6. See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1998/1999: KNOWLEDGE
FOR DEVELOPMENT (1999), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDS
ContentServer/IW3P/IB/1998/11/17/000178830_98111703550058/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf.
7. Id. at 33–36. One of my minor victories was that I anticipated the U.S. Treasury’s
unhappiness with our stance. At the meeting of the board of the World Bank where this was

2008]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

1695

Intellectual property has become one of the major issues of our
global society. Globalization is one of the most important issues of
the day, and intellectual property is one of the most important aspects
of globalization, especially as the world moves toward a knowledge
8
economy. How we regulate and manage the production of
knowledge and the right of access to knowledge is at the center of
how well this new economy, the knowledge economy, works and of
who benefits. At stake are matters of both distribution and efficiency.
Like most academics, I have ambivalent feelings about
intellectual property, illustrated by two personal stories. About
twenty years ago I received a letter from a Chinese publisher asking
me to write a preface to a pirated edition of one of my textbooks. As
an academic, I was enthusiastic about the idea. The motivation of
much academic writing is not to make money but to influence ideas
and to shape the intellectual debate. China at the time was beginning
the transition to a market economy: if my book helped shape that
transition in a way that enhanced its likely success in raising the living
standards of more than a billion people, it would have been a major
accomplishment. Looking at it even in more narrow terms, if even 1
percent of China’s billion people read my book, it would be a larger
readership than I would ever get in America. My publisher, of course,

discussed, we welcomed India’s criticism that we had not gone far enough in criticizing TRIPS.
Right after the U.S. representative gave the predictable speech about how we were “soft” on
intellectual property and had to revise our report, India spoke up, followed by a couple of other
countries, saying how our report was in fact very unbalanced with too much pro–intellectual
property language. After their strong criticism, the United States decided not to pursue the issue
any more, lest they actually wind up with a report that was less favorable than the report that we
had written. The final document reflected our more balanced judgment.
Since then, the developing countries have further articulated their concerns. At the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), they have called for a Development Oriented
Intellectual Property Regime. See WIPO, Gen. Assembly, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for
the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27, 2004), available
at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_31_11.pdf. In a
keynote address to the Ministerial Conference on Intellectual Property for Least Developed
Countries, World Intellectual Property Organization, I further developed the case for a
development oriented intellectual property regime. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Keynote Address at the
Ministerial Conference on Intellectual Property for Least Developed Countries, World
Intellectual Property Organization: Towards a Pro-Development and Balanced Intellectual
Property Regime (Oct. 25, 2004) (transcript available at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/
jstiglitz/download/2004_TOWARDS_A_PRO_DEVELOPMENT.htm). Resolutions in support
of a development oriented intellectual property regime were adopted by WIPO’s General
Assembly in September 2004.
8. In my recent book, I devote a whole chapter to the problem of intellectual property. See
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 103–32 (2006).
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was not as thrilled as I was about the notion of my ideas reaching the
Chinese audience through a pirated version of my textbook.
Later I was at a conference in Taiwan. At that time, I knew that
intellectual property rights were not always strictly enforced there.
During a break in the conference, I had a little time to go to a
bookstore. As I went to the store, I had a debate in my mind about
what I hoped to see when I arrived. On the one hand, there was the
possibility that they had stolen my intellectual property, that they had
pirated one or more of my books. As we all know, theft is a terrible
thing, and stealing intellectual property is a form of theft, so that
would have been terrible. The other possibility was that they had not
pirated one of my books and stolen my intellectual property, that they
had ignored me. As I walked to the bookstore, I came to the
conclusion that being ignored is far worse than having one’s property
stolen, and I resolved that I would actually be much happier if they
had stolen my intellectual property than if they had ignored me.
When I got to the bookstore, they had in fact stolen it, and I was
relieved.
These anecdotes make the point that researchers and academics
want their ideas to be disseminated. They work quite hard, in fact,
traveling all over the world to disseminate their ideas. By contrast,
intellectual property attempts to restrict the use of knowledge in one
way or another. Intellectual property is supposed to encourage
innovation. I argue below that a poorly designed intellectual property
regime—one that creates excessively “strong” intellectual property
rights—can actually impede innovation.
I. THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN INNOVATION SYSTEMS
The intellectual property regime is part of society’s innovation
system, and its intent is to provide incentives to innovate by allowing
innovators to restrict the use of the knowledge they produce by
allowing the imposition of charges on the use of that knowledge,
thereby obtaining a return on their investment. But it is important
when thinking about intellectual property rights (IPR)—which
include patents, copyrights, and various other parts of the intellectual
property system—to realize that there are many other parts of
society’s innovation system. There are other ways of financing and
producing research—for instance, through universities and
government-supported research labs. In fact, I would argue, perhaps
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immodestly, that the most important ideas are those that are
generated in universities, and many of the most important intellectual
advances are not covered at all by the patent system. Look at the
basic idea underlying the computer, Alan Turing’s “Turing Machine”:
9
it was not protected by the patent system. Ideas like asymmetric
information are not covered by intellectual property.10
Another example of important innovations not driven by IPR is
the open source movement, which has been particularly successful in
software. Even when research is financed by firms, there are other
ways of providing returns on knowledge instead of using patents, such
as trade secrets and advantages that come naturally to the first
entrants in a market economy. There are also other ways of providing
incentives; one of them I will discuss is a prize system, which has
actually been a part of the innovation system for a couple hundred
years. I will argue that, from a societal perspective, prizes have
marked advantages over the patent system.
Our innovation system rests on foundations of basic research,
and most basic research occurs within academia and governmentsponsored research laboratories. Monetary returns are only a small
part of what motivates these researchers. Thus, the basic framework
of what induces people to engage in research is really not reflected in
the intellectual property regime. Obviously, research has to be
financed. It takes resources, so the question is not just how we
motivate research but also how we finance it. As I shall comment
below, financing research through monopoly profits may be neither
the most efficient nor the most equitable way of doing so.
The key issue is the role of the patent system, or the intellectual
property regime more broadly, within the economy’s innovation

9. Turing was interested in the question of what it means to be computable, that is, if one
can specify a sequence of instructions, or an algorithm, which when followed will result in a
completion of the task. Turing Machines are thus simple, abstract computational devices which
help to investigate the extent of what can be computed. David Barker-Plummer, Turing
Machines, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward Zalta ed., Winer 2003 ed.),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2007/entries/turing-machine/. For more information, see
generally DAVID LEAVITT, THE MAN WHO KNEW TOO MUCH: ALAN TURING AND THE
INVENTION OF THE COMPUTER (2006).
10. These ideas have played a very important role, for instance, in modern financial
markets, both in design and in regulation. Much of my earlier research focused on the analysis
of markets marked by information asymmetries. Sometimes I might wish that intellectual
property rights extended to such ideas; if they had, I would probably be in a different economic
position than I am today, but it would have been detrimental for society had these ideas been
“covered” by intellectual property.
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system. To address the next issue, the design of the patent or IPR
system more generally, one has to understand the limited (though still
important) role of the IPR regime to address the next issue: the
design of the patent or IPR regime. There are a host of questions,
many of which absorb much of the energy of the lawyers involved in
obtaining and fighting patents. These issues include what can be
patented, the breadth of the patent, the standard of novelty, the
procedures for granting and challenging patents, the rules for patent
enforcement, and the notion of responsibilities as well as rights.
For instance, to get a patent you have to disclose enough
information that somebody could replicate what is being patented
(though often firms try to get away with disclosing as little as
possible).11 Disclosure has long been an important part of the patent
and intellectual property regime;12 it is one of the reasons why IPR
can enhance innovation: people can build on that knowledge.
Knowledge is the most important input into knowledge. Interestingly,
in some of the more recent intellectual property disputes, the notion
of disclosure has been contested. Microsoft has, by most accounts, not
wanted to disclose even its protocols (required for interoperability
with applications). The European Union has insisted that it at least
disclose specifications for its protocols13 and Microsoft has tried
everything not to comply with the European Union’s requirement,
even to the point of risking millions of dollars in fines.14

11. For the specification requirement applicable in the United States, see 35 U.S.C. § 112
(2000).
12. Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1643–44 (2007).
13. Commission Decision Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft of 24 March 2004, para. 30,
2007 O.J. (L 32) 23, 27 (EC) (“The Decision orders Microsoft to disclose the information that it
has refused to supply and to allow its use for the development of compatible products. The
disclosure order is limited to protocol specifications, and to ensuring interoperability with the
essential features that define a typical work group network.”). The full text of the Commission
Decision is available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/
en.pdf. In September 2007, the Court of First Instance of the European Communities upheld
the European Commission decision. Press Release No. 63/07, Court of First Instance of the Eur.
Cmtys., The Court of First Instance Essentially Upholds the Commission’s Decision Finding
that Microsoft Abused Its Dominant Position, (Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://curia.europa.
eu/en/actu/communiques/cp07/aff/cp070063en.pdf.
14. See Mary Jacoby, Second Front: Why Microsoft Battles Europe Years after Settling with
U.S.—Suspicions and Missteps Keep Its Antitrust Case Alive; Guarding Rival Engineers—Spat
over Encrypting a Disk, WALL ST. J., May 5, 2006, at A1; Kevin O’Brien, Microsoft, Trying to
Avoid a European Fine, Defends Demand for Royalties, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2007, at C12.
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Furthermore, as with any property right, there are restrictions on
the use of intellectual property. The fact that you have a property
right does not mean you can do anything that you want with it.
Owning a bat does not give you the right to hit someone over the
head with it. In the case of intellectual property, one of the
restrictions is that you cannot engage in abusive, anticompetitive
15
behavior. The rights of governments to issue compulsory licenses
form another important part of the patent regime. One of the
responses to the abusive, anticompetitive practices has been to
restrict the use of patents, effectively insisting on compulsory
licensing, sometimes through forming patent pools. In the consent
decree in the case of the antitrust action against AT&T in the 1950s,
AT&T had to make its patents available to anybody that wanted to
use them.16 In my Tunney filing17 in the Microsoft case, I argued that
one way of dealing with that company’s anticompetitive behavior was
18
to limit its intellectual property rights. Such restrictions would, I
suggested, enhance innovation in our economy.
More generally, the design of the patent system can affect the
efficiency of the economy and its innovativeness. The current patent
system imposes large costs on the economy, and one of the questions
is whether there are reforms that could increase the economy’s
efficiency and innovativeness. I believe there are. To understand
these issues one has to look at the economic foundations of
knowledge.
A. Static Inefficiency: Knowledge as a Public Good
The important basic idea is that knowledge is a public good.
Economists use the concept of a public good as a technical term; Paul
19
Samuelson defined it precisely more than fifty years ago. A public

15. E.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) (explaining that
public policy “forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not
granted by the Patent Office”).
16. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,246, at 71,139 (D.N.J. 1956).
17. Declaration of Joseph E. Stiglitz and Jason Furman, United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233), available at http://usdoj.gov/atr/
cases/ms_tuncom/major/mtc-00030610c.pdf. Pursuant to the Tunney Act, members of the public
have an opportunity to comment on a proposed settlement of a civil antitrust suit before it is
accepted by a court. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)–(d) (2006).
18. Declaration of Joseph E. Stiglitz & Jason Furman, supra note 17, at 31.
19. Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT.
387, 387 (1954).
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good is a good whose consumption is nonrivalrous. By contrast,
private goods can only be consumed by one person. For instance, only
one person can sit in a chair. The same goes for food: if I eat the
hamburger, you cannot eat it. Knowledge, however, is different. I
have just shared with you some of the things I know, but sharing this
knowledge with you has not taken away from what I know. Thus,
knowledge has the quality of nonrivalrous consumption.
Another way of putting it is that there is no marginal cost
associated with the use of knowledge. Thomas Jefferson described
this much more poetically. Jefferson said that knowledge was like a
candle: when one candle lights another it does not diminish the light
20
of the first candle. Understanding this concept is at the core of
understanding efficiency in the use of knowledge. It is more efficient
to distribute knowledge freely to everybody than to restrict its use by
charging for it.
Free distribution, however, could cause problems for creating
incentives for the production of innovation, and that is the dynamic
issue. Before turning to the question of dynamic efficiency, though, I
want to emphasize that efficiency in use means knowledge should be
freely available. The problem is that intellectual property rights
circumscribe the use of knowledge and thus, almost necessarily, cause
inefficiency. Not only does intellectual property create a distortion by
restricting the use of knowledge, but it also does something even
worse: it creates monopoly power. Monopoly leads not just to
inequities but also to major distortions of resource allocations;
limiting monopoly power and its abuses is the focus of anti-trust
policy. There is a quandary. We not only tolerate this distortion and
inefficiency by restricting the use of knowledge, which creates
monopoly power, but we sanction it: it is part of our legal framework
because we hope it will promote innovation.
If we do not design this legal framework properly, however, it
may actually impede innovation. That is where I will eventually take
this argument. Before getting there, though, I want to point out that
the social cost of the distortion of the patent system is particularly
high. (By contrast, Schumpeter suggested that it would be lower than
for other forms of monopolization.)

20.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THE WRITINGS
A. Lipscomb ed., 1904).

OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 334 (Andrew
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1. Access to Medicine. One of the reasons that the costs are so
high is that the patent system impedes access to lifesaving drugs for
billions. I opposed TRIPS (the so-called Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, part of the Uruguay
WTO agreement signed in 1994) so strongly in part because of these
effects. Indeed, I believe one of the main reasons the pharmaceutical
industry was pushing for TRIPS was that they wanted to reduce
access to generic medicines. These are so disliked by the drug
companies for the same reason that they are so liked by everybody
else: the prices of generic drugs are very low. The low price means
that people who could not afford the brand name drugs still can buy
the generic drugs, and the competition with the generics drives down
the price of the brand name drugs. The loss of sales to generics as well
as the lower prices in turn lowers the profits of the large (brand
name) pharmaceutical companies; it is understandable why they have
pushed so hard (and contributed so much to campaigns) for IPR.
One example that shows the magnitude of what is at stake (and
that has received a lot of attention), are the AIDS drugs. One year’s
treatment of the brand name drugs, not the most recent ones, but the
21
older ones which are less expensive, costs $10,000. In a poor
developing country, where the per capita income is $300, or even
$3,000, a person with AIDS is not going to be able to afford $10,000.
They might be able to afford the generic medicines, which sell for less
than $200. When the trade ministers signed the TRIPS agreement in
Marrakesh in the spring of 1994, they were in effect signing the death
warrants on thousands of people in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere
in the developing countries. This is one of the reasons that TRIPS has
generated such immense concern.22

21. MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIERÈS, UNTANGLING THE WEB OF PRICE REDUCTIONS: A
PRICING GUIDE FOR THE PURCHASE OF ARVS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (10th ed. Sept.
2007,
available
at
http://www.accessmedmsf.org/fileadmin/user_upload/diseases/hivaids/
Untangling_the_Web/UTW10_RSep_horizontal.pdf.
22. Defenders of TRIPS claim that it contained “flexibilities” to address these concerns—
the right to issue compulsory licenses. But the drug companies intended to make it difficult for
developing companies to issue these compulsory licenses, and subsequent bilateral trade
agreements have made it even more difficult. Had the intention been to retain access to lifesaving generic medicines for developing countries, TRIPS would have provided for an
automatic right to issue compulsory licenses for expensive, life-saving medicines. The United
States has put enormous pressure on countries that have threatened to issue compulsory
licenses not to do so, and few have.
The issue is not only of concern to developing countries. In the United States, with nearly
47 million individuals not having health insurance and with health insurance often not paying
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2. Leveraging Monopoly Power and Other Abuses of IPR. The
efficiency costs of IPR go beyond the direct effects associated with
monopolization of the particular product covered by the patent:
Intellectual Property Rights generate monopoly power that can be
used to leverage further monopoly power. The most obvious example
is Microsoft, which has leveraged its monopoly power in operating
systems to obtain a dominant position in applications like word
processing (Microsoft Office) and Internet browsers (Internet
Explorer). The courts and regulators in the United States,23 in the
24
25
European Union, and in South Korea have all ruled against
Microsoft. There is little disagreement about the fact that Microsoft
has engaged in abusive, anticompetitive practices. The only debate is
what to do about it; because Microsoft has so much monopoly power
and has obtained such a dominant position, it is not easy to figure out
how to deal with the problem.
There is actually a long history of abusive uses of intellectual
property rights. Going back to the beginning of the last century, the
automobile and the airplane were two of the most important
innovations, and the development and success of both were impeded
by IPR. In the case of the automobile, a patent was granted,26 but it
was an excessively generic patent for a four-wheeled, self-propelled
vehicle. The person who received the patent had no intention of
developing the automobile; instead, he used it to form a cartel.27
Often, the best, or at least the easiest, way of making money is not to
come up with a better idea but to form a monopoly or a cartel and
restrict competition. For those seeking easy profits, competitive
marketplaces are very bad because they drive down prices and erase

for newer drugs, the high prices also reduce access to life saving medicines. A striking example
is the patent on the genes associated with breast cancer, which means that many women cannot
afford the tests which can identify whether they are at risk. See text accompanying note 43.
23. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
24. Commission Decision Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft of 24 March 2004, supra note
12; see also Stephen Castle, European Court Rejects Microsoft Appeal over Media Player, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 23, 2003, at 33; Kevin J. O’Brien & Steve Lohn, European Court
Faults Microsoft on Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007 at A1.
25. Korea Fair Trade Commission, The Findings of the Microsoft Case (Dec. 7, 2005) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal); see also Anna Fifield, S. Korea Watchdog Stands by Microsoft
Ruling, FIN. TIMES (London), May 24, 2006, at 30; Choe Sang-Hun, Microsoft Loses Antitrust
Case in S. Korea, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Dec. 8, 2005, at 13.
26. U.S. Patent No. 549,160 (filed Nov. 5, 1895).
27. The case of the airplane raises a quite different set of issues, discussed at length in the
next Section.
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profits. IPR can be an important way of maintaining a cartel. Most
of the automobile companies went along with the idea of the patentdriven cartel, except for one. There was one innovator who had a
different conception of what the automobile was about, and that was
Henry Ford. He had the idea of a people’s car, at a low price; that
idea was totally inconsistent with the cartel’s view of a high-priced,
restricted-use vehicle. Ford challenged the patent.29 Had he not had
the resources and the determination, he would not have succeeded in
this legal battle; however, he eventually did prevail.30 Had he failed,
the development of the automobile as we know it would have been
31
delayed for a long time.
The automobile patent illustrates two other problems with the
patent system: The first is the difficulty of determining the
“boundaries” of property rights. In the case of “real” property (land),
we can define the property right precisely by the geographical
boundaries. We may have to further specify whether the property
right extends to mineral rights and air rights, and whether there are
public rights of way. But the limitations are easy to specify and are
well understood. In the case of intellectual property, there are no
such natural borders. Should the intellectual property right have
extended to all self-propelled vehicles, or only to those that are
propelled in a particular way?
These boundary issues are related to another issue: it is widely
agreed that if patents are to promote innovation, they should be given
for, and only for, an idea that is “novel.” If the original patent is
overly broad, and encompasses all four-wheeled, self-propelled
vehicles, then a truly novel way of self-propelling may not be granted
a patent or may have to pay the owner of the original patent so much
as to attenuate incentives for innovation. Drug companies and others
have tried to extend the effective life of a patent by making

28. The holder of the patent can impose conditions on those to whom he issues a license to
use his patent—restrictions on output and pricing that allow the industry to act as a cartel. In
effect, the patent owner acts as the cartel ring leader. This is an instance in which IPR gives rise
to what Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia called the supreme evil of anti-trust. See Verizon
Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004). Whether, and
under what conditions, such behavior would today be viewed as abusive remains controversial.
29. Did Not Infringe on Selden Engine—U.S. Court of Appeals Reverses the Decision of
Lower Court Against Auto Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1911, at 5.
30. See Columbia Motor Car Co. v. C. A. Duerr & Co., 184 F. 893 (2d Cir. 1911).
31. Given the concerns about global warming, that might have been a good thing, but that
was not one of the issues on the agenda at the time.
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incremental improvements on existing drugs. In a recent case, Indian
32
courts ruled against Novartis’ attempt to do so.
Whether a product is novel depends on the state of knowledge
throughout the world. It is often difficult for the patent office to
determine whether someone in the rest of the world might have had
the idea before this patent was granted; in the case of the automobile,
it is arguable that others in Europe had the idea before the granting
of the 1895 patent. The United States has often been somewhat
provincial in its approach to knowledge within the patent system. For
33
instance, the United States gave a patent for basmati rice. Indians
had been consuming basmati rice for a thousand or more years, but
those in the patent office in Washington responsible for reviewing the
patent application obviously had not had the pleasure of eating
basmati rice. They thought it was a wonderful innovation and granted
a patent to it. Had India implemented and enforced this patent, every
time anybody in India ate basmati rice they would have to send a
check to Texas to pay for this idea which they thought was theirs in
the first place.34
Ordinarily, property rights are argued for as a means of
achieving economic efficiency; intellectual property rights, by
contrast, result in a static inefficiency which can only be justified by
the dynamic incentives. These examples suggest that the static
inefficiencies may be greater than is often thought. Later, I will argue
that the dynamic benefits may be less.
Of course, any method of raising funds for innovation has a
social cost. In the case of a monopoly, the way you raise funds is
through the disparity between the price and the marginal cost. The
patent system, however, is not an optimal way of raising money
because it is not an optimal tax; it creates a particularly large set of
distortions, which is one of the reasons why it is particularly
35
objectionable. Later in this talk, I will discuss the issue of financing
research more broadly.

32. Amelia Gentleman, Setback for Novartis in India Over Drug Patent Protection, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at C1.
33. U.S. Patent No. 5,663,484 (filed July 8, 1994).
34. This is an example of a more general problem which has received considerable
attention in developing countries, called biopiracy, the patenting of drugs and other products
based on traditional knowledge.
35. There are also equity issues associated with this particular way of financing research.
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3. Schumpeterian Competition.
Standard competitive
equilibrium theory has paid very little attention to innovation. The
only rigorous proof of the efficiency of competitive markets is
36
provided by the Arrow-Debreu model, and that model assumes that
technology is fixed. One might think this is strange; how could
economic theory pay any attention to models that assume technology
is fixed in a dynamic economy? That is a question that sociologists
ought to address, but the Arrow-Debreu competitive model is the
standard, reigning paradigm, and sadly, it ignores innovation. Most
first-year graduate courses in economics, and most introductory
textbooks (until my textbook came out37), simply did not talk about
innovation in any systematic way. But there was a strand of thought
associated with Joseph Schumpeter that focused on innovation and
argued that this competition for innovation resulted in temporary
monopolies.38 One monopoly followed after another; new firms tried
to displace the existing monopolist. In this sense, there could be
intense competition. This kind of competition was referred to as
Schumpeterian competition.
Some of my earlier research, however, pointed out that
Schumpeter was wrong about the temporary nature of monopoly.
Monopoly power, once established, can easily be perpetuated.39 Not
only is it possible to perpetuate monopoly power, in fact, there is an
incentive to do so. This is particularly evident in the case of network
externalities and in situations where there are important switching
costs, such as those that arise from learning. That is one of the
reasons why Microsoft is so difficult to deal with. The monopoly
power persists even after the bad practices which enabled it to create
that power have been terminated.

36. Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive
Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 265 (1954).
37. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS (1st ed. 1993).
38. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 102
(5th ed. 1976) (“[T]here is or may be an element of genuine monopoly gain in those
entrepreneurial profits which are the prizes offered by capitalist society to the successful
innovator.”).
39. See Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure and the Speed
of R&D, 11 BELL J. ECON. 1, 27 (1980) (“[T]he belief that competition in R&D is a substitute
for competition in the product market or that it will eventually give rise to competition in the
product market has been shown to be suspect: there are conditions under which monopolies
may persist even without any formal barriers to entry other than those provided by the patent
system . . . .”).
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4. Further Costs to the Patent System. The transactions costs
associated with our IPR system are a further problem, although
whether you view them as costs or benefits may depend on your
position in the economy. For lawyers, transaction costs are a benefit,
40
because they are a source of their income. But from a social
perspective, these administrative costs are a social cost. Litigation
over patents also introduces uncertainty. Of course, there is always an
intrinsic uncertainty of research, but it is compounded by the risk of
patent infringement and the associated risk of litigation.
B. Dynamic Costs
The patent system can only be justified, given all its costs, in
terms of dynamic efficiency: the benefits that result from an enhanced
pace of innovation. Recent events (in particular those surrounding
Microsoft)41 suggest not only that the economic costs may be higher
and may last longer than was previously realized, but also that the
benefits may be lower. In particular, the incentives for research and
development may be less, and there may be important distortions in
the way money is spent, that is to say, in the direction of research.
The patent system, because of its poor design, may be slowing down
the pace of innovation.
This raises the question, can one obtain the dynamic benefits—if
they exist—at lower costs? I will argue that, at least in some cases,
one can.
1. The Fundamental Problem: The Disparity Between Marginal
Private and Social Returns. The fundamental problem is that under
the patent system the rewards do not correspond to the marginal
social returns.
The marginal social return is having innovation available earlier
than it otherwise would have been. That is to say, if the idea was
going to occur anyway to somebody else, then the contribution of the
“innovator” is just that the idea occurred a little earlier than would
otherwise have been the case.
For anyone engaged in research this is well understood, but we
like to ignore it. I would like to think that if I had not solved the

40. Just as the high transaction costs faced by retirees would have been viewed as a benefit
by Wall Street if we had privatized social security.
41. See supra notes 16, 23–24 and accompanying text.
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problem of how markets with asymmetric information work, the
problem would not have been solved. The reality is that somebody
else would almost surely have made similar discoveries, maybe the
next day, the next month, or the next year, or maybe in ten years, but
it would have happened eventually. I did solve it earlier than anybody
else did. From a social point of view, my contribution is making this
knowledge available earlier, and only the extent to which that
knowledge occurred earlier than it otherwise would have is what
ought to be rewarded; economic efficiency requires that people’s
compensation be related to their marginal social returns.
The patent system does not reward people on the basis of the
marginal social return of their contribution. It gives the individual or
firm that is first the entire value of the innovation, which obviously
can well exceed the marginal social contribution. The benefits to the
innovator are justified by saying they are a proxy for the marginal
social contribution, but the returns provided under a patent are a very
bad proxy. As a result, it introduces a distortion. This is the critical
insight: we are dealing with second, third, and fourth-best economics.
First-best economics would have compensation commensurate with
the marginal social contribution, but unfortunately, it is not easy to
assess that—it is not possible, in general, to determine when the
innovation would have otherwise occurred. (First-best economics also
would provide compensation in a way that does not give rise to
monopoly distortions.)
The human genome project is a case where there is a clear
distinction between what those who obtained patents received and
their marginal social returns. There was a major international effort
to decode the human genome, and by the early 1990s it seemed clear
42
that it would be done within a few years. There was a race, though,
among the private entrepreneurs to complete the project a little
faster; they were willing to spend lots of money to finish it a day
faster, a month faster, maybe at most a year faster. Why? If they
could decode the genome and identify a gene, say the gene for breast
cancer, a year earlier, or even a day earlier, they would receive a
patent. That would mean that anybody who wanted to be tested to
know whether they had a likelihood of getting breast cancer would
have to pay a huge amount of money, as they would have a monopoly
42. Clive Cookson, A Spur for the Gene Hunters: The Mapping of Mankind’s Genetic
Make-up Sets a Medical Landmark, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 20, 1993, at 12 (indicating that
the human genome was likely to be decoded “in the first decade of the next century”).
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on the use of this gene. The biopharmaceutical company Myriad
43
received this patent and has been using, or I would say abusing, this
patent. There are others who have been willing to make the
diagnostic tests free, but those with the patent say no, we own your
gene. You might think that you own it, but no, they own it. The
market price for this test is several thousand dollars.44 Of course, if
you do not have insurance, and nearly 47 million Americans do not
45
have insurance, it means that you may not be able to afford to have
this test; most of those who do not have insurance also have limited
income, so they cannot pay the several thousand dollars required and
will not get the test. Many of them may die as a result of not having
the appropriate diagnostic test.
This is a case where there are clear social costs to the patent, and
there are very little social benefits from the faster innovation.
Interestingly, this is a case where other jurisdictions have taken a
different view. In Canada, the government has said, in effect, this is
too outrageous and will not allow the patent,46 and so people in
Canada can get this test much more cheaply.
There are further distortions associated with patents that I have
talked about elsewhere. Of particular concern is that much of the
returns arise as a result of what is called enclosing the commons.
Professor Boyle here at Duke has used that term, “enclosing the
commons,” to suggest privatizing something that was (and perhaps
47
ought to be) in the public domain. In sixteenth and seventeenth
century Scotland and England, common land that was used, for
instance, for grazing was enclosed. There was allegedly some benefit:
privatization led to the more efficient use of the commons. In the case
of knowledge, however, the enclosure results in an inefficiency, that
is, knowledge is used less effectively. In short, privatizing knowledge

43. U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995).
44. Nat’l Cancer Inst., Genetic Testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2: It’s Your Choice,
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
45. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2006, at 19 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/
p60-233.pdf.
46. Caroline Mullen, Gene Tests for Cancer Won’t Stop, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 20, 2001, at
A3 (indicating that the Ontario government would continue providing the test over Myriad’s
objections).
47. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 39 (Winter/Spring 2003) (“Both overtly and
covertly, the commons of facts and ideas is being enclosed.”).
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imposes short-run costs and is only efficient when there are sufficient
offsetting incentives for more research.
Biopiracy provides an important instance where it is evident that
this is not the case. I was first introduced to the concept of biopiracy
when I was in a small indigenous village in the high Andes of
48
Ecuador. In this particular village, the mayor went on at great length
about the problem of biopiracy (the patenting by American and other
foreign companies of indigenous medicines, plants, or a variety of
indigenous ideas and traditional knowledge) in Ecuador. In other
words, biopiracy involves taking what was in the public domain and
privatizing it. Basmati rice is one example. Another example, in some
ways more dramatic, concerns the healing property of turmeric.
Turmeric is a root, used widely as a spice, but which has been known
in India for its healing properties for hundreds, probably thousands of
years. Two South Asian doctors working in the United States
recognized that, under American law, they could get a patent; even
though the healing properties of turmeric were known in India, they
may have guessed that the patent examiner in Washington would
probably not know about those properties. They may have thought
that, because the healing properties of turmeric were not “published,”
they had a good chance of getting a patent. But, of course, there is a
difficulty of publishing things that “everybody” knows—or at least
everybody except the patent examiner. This presents a classic Catch22 situation. You cannot publish it because it is widely known, but if it
is not published, then it is (from the perspective of the patent
examiner) “not known.” It is not prior art, and so you can get a
patent. In the end, the doctors received the patent,49 with the result
that if India had recognized and enforced this patent, it would have
meant that anyone in India who used turmeric for healing purposes
would have to send a check to these Indian doctors in the United
States in recognition of their patent. This was not a patent that was
generating research, or an advance of knowledge, in any way. It
imposed a societal cost, without any corresponding benefit.

48. I am always astounded by differences in what people know about. Those in the high
Andes might not know about abstruse aspects of intellectual property, but they knew more
about how IPR was affecting them and about biopiracy than many specialists in IPR in the
advanced industrial countries.
49. U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (filed Dec. 28, 1993).
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2. Why Patents May Impede Innovation: Raising the Cost of
Knowledge. So far, I have explained why it is that the returns to
patents do not correspond to the social benefits. I now want to go
further and explain why it is that patents may actually slow
innovation. Knowledge is the most important input into the
production of knowledge. Intellectual property restricts this input;
indeed, it works by limiting access to knowledge. One way of thinking
about this is in terms of any standard production process. If you
increase the price of an input, it reduces the supply of the output.50 In
this case, the input is knowledge; patents increase the price of this
input, which in turn reduces the output.
3. Why Patents May Impede Innovation: Monopolization.
There are other reasons that patents may impede innovation. One is
that incentives for innovation are less with monopoly than in a more
competitive marketplace. There are several reasons for this. First,
monopolists produce less—because they charge higher prices.
Because they produce less, the benefit from reducing the cost of
production by a given amount is less.51 Moreover, monopolists do not
have the spur of competition. They may realize, in addition, that an
innovation may lead to a decrease in the value of their existing
capital.
Not only do monopolists have a diminished incentive for
engaging in research themselves, but monopolists can also increase
their profit by discouraging innovation by rivals and raising rivals’
costs. It was, in my judgment, correctly argued that Microsoft did
exactly this. In fact, one of the charges brought against Microsoft in
one state was not only that Microsoft’s behavior raised prices, but
52
that it actually also slowed down innovation. That argument was also

50. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS 304–05 (2d ed. 1997).
51. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources of Invention,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
609, 619–22 (Richard Nelson ed., 1962).
52. Plaintiffs Modified Fourth Amended Petition at 2, Joe Comes, Riley Paint, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp. (Iowa Dist. Ct. Feb. 8, 2006) (No. CL82311) (“The purpose and effect of
Microsoft’s illegal conduct has been to deny purchasers of Microsoft operating systems and
applications software at a competitive price and free choice among competing software
products, as well as to deny them the benefit of software innovation.”); see also David Elbert,
Lawyers for Microsoft Try to Limit Class-Action Suit; Plaintiffs Say the Software Giant Kept
Innovations from Reaching Consumers, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 23, 2006, at D1.
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an important part of the European Union’s case against Microsoft.
In particular, as Microsoft repeatedly demonstrated its ability to
leverage its monopoly power in PC operating systems (maintained
through IPR) into other arenas (by, for instance, squashing rival
innovators like Netscape), it discouraged innovation further.
Innovators knew that if they produced a product of sufficient import
to attract Microsoft’s attention, they would lose the battle with this
giant.
4. Why Patents May Impede Innovation: Patent Thickets.
Another important problem with the patent system arises from
defining what a piece of intellectual property is. For instance, land
can be staked out and described precisely, although even then there
may be boundary disputes. Intellectual property, however, is
different; it is very hard to define precisely what is your property,
what is somebody else’s property, and what is in the public domain.
Intellectual property does not have clear longitude or latitude; it is
difficult to delineate boundaries. This results in numerable patent
disputes that discourage innovation, and in a specific problem that is
called a patent thicket. Patent thickets especially impede innovation.
Again, this is a problem that has been known for a very long time.
As I mentioned earlier, one important innovation at the
beginning of the last century was the automobile; patents almost
suppressed this important innovation. The other important
innovation was the airplane, and a patent thicket did impede the
development of the airplane. Everyone knows about the Wright
brothers and their first manned flight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina,
in 1903; their plane is even depicted on the license plates in that state.
The Wright brothers obtained some key patents, but so did another
innovator, named Glenn Curtiss. Thus, it was unclear whom you paid
if you wanted to develop an airplane. If you paid both of them what
they demanded, it became too costly to develop an airplane. If you
paid only one of them, you risked a suit from the other. And so, the
airplane was not developed until World War I, when it was
recognized that winning the war was more important than IPR (or
allowing patent lawyers to make money). The United States

53. Commission Decision Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft of 24 March 2004, supra note
12, at para. 29 (“The tying of WMP rather shields Microsoft from effective competition from
potentially more efficient media player vendors, which could challenge its position, thus
reducing the talent and capital invested in innovation in respect of media players.”).
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government effectively seized the patents and determined how much
was to be paid to whom. The development of the airplane proceeded
54
very quickly thereafter.
5. Distortions in the Patterns of Research. Patents may not only
discourage innovation generally, but they also may lead to a
distortion in the pattern of innovation. On the one hand, research and
development activity can be directed at circumventing monopolies—
getting around a patent—or, on the other hand, they can be directed
at strengthening monopolies. Arguably, one of the concerns about
Microsoft’s new Vista operating system is that it was designed to
make interoperability more difficult in order to strengthen its
monopoly power. These research and development expenditures
actually lower welfare, in contrast with the social returns that arise
from creating new products and lowering costs, both of which
enhance welfare. This illustrates the point that stronger intellectual
property rights may not lead to a faster pace of innovation.
II. THE INNOVATION SYSTEM
As I have said, one needs to look at the patent system, or
copyright system, within the context of the broader innovation
system. There are a number of tasks that any innovation system has
to perform. The first is the selection of projects and researchers. Who
is going to do the research, and what projects are going to be
undertaken? The second task is financing. The production of
knowledge is not costless, so there has to be some way of financing it.
This is related to the third issue, that of risk absorption; research
is risky: if you knew the outcome, it would not really be research.
There is an inherent uncertainty about research. The question is, who
bears that risk?
Fourth, any effective innovation system has to provide incentives
for individuals and firms to innovate (both incentives to work hard
and incentives to innovate).
Fifth, a well functioning innovation system has to disseminate and
use the knowledge when it is produced.

54. For a discussion of this story, see TOM D. CROUCH, THE BISHOP’S BOYS: A LIFE OF
WILBUR AND ORVILLE WRIGHT (1989); SETH SHULMAN, UNLOCKING THE SKY: GLENN
HAMMOND CURTISS AND THE RACE TO INVENT THE AIRPLANE (2002).
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In evaluating the different parts of the innovation system, one
has to ask how well they perform these roles and what costs they
impose on the rest of the economic system. I already referred to the
55
patent system’s high distortionary cost as well as the transactions
56
costs. I would argue that a well-designed innovation system will be a
mixed system, involving patents and other elements, like prizes and
government support of basic research, for instance, at a university. In
assessing our current innovation system, the questions are, are we
relying too heavily on the patent system? And is the patent system
well designed for achieving the objectives, or should we reform it?
A. The Patent System
The critique of the patent system is that, besides the large static
and dynamic distortions that I have described, there is a problem of
distortionary finance. As I said before, under the patent system
research is financed out of monopoly profits. The difference between
the price and the marginal cost can be viewed as a tax. In other words,
one can think of the patent system as combining a competitive pricing
system with a tax per unit output (the difference between the price
and the marginal cost of production), the revenues from which are
devoted to financing research. Part of the problem with the patent
system, however, is that much of that revenue does not go to finance
research. The drug companies spend more money on advertising and
marketing than they do on research.57 Moreover, the directions in
which they allocate their research budget do not accord well with
broader social objectives: they spend more money on lifestyle drugs,
such as for hair regrowth, than they do on lifesaving drugs. So, there
is a lot of what you might call “leakage” in this particular tax system:
It is an inefficient tax in failing to deliver the revenue into the
important areas of research, where it should go.
Putting that critical problem aside, one can still ask, is it a good
tax system? Is it a good way of raising revenue for financing research
and development? The answer is no. It has one property which some
may think is desirable (although, as I shall explain, I think even this
property may, especially in this context, actually be undesirable): the
“tax” is a benefit tax. That is to say, the only people who are
55. See supra Part I.
56. See supra Part I.A.4.
57. Marc-André & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of
Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLOS MED. 29, 29 (2008).
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58
ostensibly paying for a heart medicine are the people who use the
heart medicine, so there is a linkage between who benefits and who
pays. But in most other areas it is not viewed to be a good thing to
have a benefit tax, which is why there is relatively little reliance on
benefit taxes. It is a particularly poor way of raising revenues for
research on diseases. It is bad enough that a person has a heart
problem, but then to say because someone has a heart problem then
he or she should also have to pay for heart research is imposing a
double penalty. Put another way, within the context of any utilitarian
or Rawlsian social welfare function, (or any of the other generally
accepted views of social justice), a benefit tax for medicine cannot be
justified. There are other public services in which a benefit tax might
be justified, but not in the areas of lifesaving medicines.
Financing research through “monopoly power” entails, of course,
using a distortionary tax, and one of the major areas of advancement
in public finance in the last thirty years has been the analysis of the
distortionary and distributive impacts of tax systems. We know how
to raise revenues in ways that are less distortionary and more
equitable.59 The “monopoly benefit tax” is more distortionary and
more inequitable than alternative tax systems.
There are, in particular, a number of broader inequities and
inefficiencies associated with patents as a source of finance for
research. I have noted that knowledge is a global public good, which
means the benefits can be enjoyed by anybody in the world.60 The

58. I am quite deliberate in saying that the people who benefit from the drug are
“ostensibly” the ones who pay, because in fact, few people actually pay for their own medicines
when it comes to life-saving drugs, such as those dealing with AIDS. In most countries, it is the
government who bears the cost; in the United States and a few others, some of the costs are
borne by private insurance companies. In either case, the price system is not working in the
same way that it does for conventional commodities, like steel or chairs. Individuals do not
make decisions on their own about what drugs to take, and they normally are simply following
the directions of doctors. In particular, because someone else is picking up the tab, they, or their
doctors, pay little if any attention to price. Doctors can be encouraged to pay some attention to
prices, but the prices that they should be paying attention to are the marginal costs, not the price
cum “tax” (the monopoly price). That price distorts decisionmaking.
59. The general theory is laid out in A.B. ATKINSON & J.E. STIGLITZ, LECTURES IN
PUBLIC ECONOMICS (1980).
60. Global public goods are any goods of which the benefits accrue to anybody in the
world. The concept was first articulated in J.E. Stiglitz, “The Theory of International Public
Goods and the Architecture of International Organizations,” Background Paper No. 7, Third
Meeting, High Level Group on Development Strategy and Management of the Market
Economy, UNU/WIDER, Helsinki, Finland, July 8-10, 1995. For more information, see Joseph
E. Stiglitz, Global Public Goods and Global Finance: Does Global Governance Ensure that the
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standard principles of equitable finance say that a public good should
61
be financed by those most able to pay. Unfortunately, IPR do not,
for the most part, recognize differences in circumstances other than
the extent to which profits can be extracted. In other words, IPR will
(effectively) recognize differences in elasticities of demand (because
the monopolist can extract more profits when demand is less elastic),
but not any other circumstances, and therefore inherently represents
an inequitable way of financing research.
The bottom line is that raising revenues for financing research
through the granting of monopoly power cannot be justified by any
generally accepted principles of public finance.
There is another problem that has not received adequate
attention: the bias toward excessive patenting. This bias arises
because there is an asymmetry between the granting of a patent and
fighting a patent. When a firm gets a patent, it encloses the commons,
making private what would otherwise be public; it receives a private
return for obtaining a patent—regardless of whether the patent was
or was not deserved. But when a firm challenges a patent, it creates a
public good, because if it successfully challenges a patent, that piece
of knowledge enters the public domain, where anybody can use it.
Thus, challenging a patent is a public good. The result, of course, is
that there will be an underinvestment in fighting bad patents, and an
overinvestment in trying to get bad patents.
The problem is exacerbated by poor procedures, especially in
granting and enforcing patents in the United States. In Europe, there
is a process of opposition: those who believe the patent should not be
granted have an opportunity to express their views to the patent
office before a patent is granted.
In America, once granted, the owner of the patent can exclude
others from using his intellectual property until the patent is
overturned. The consequences were seen in a dramatic way in the case
of the Blackberry, which was accused of patent infringement. Even
though Blackberry challenged the patents—and so far in preliminary
rulings (two of the rulings are final), all the patents have been

Global Public Interest is Served?, in ADVANCING PUBLIC GOODS 149, 149–64 (Jean-Philippe
Touffut ed., 2006). Knowledge is an especially important example of a global public good. See
J.E. Stiglitz,, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS:
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 308, 308–25 (Inge Kaul, Isabelle
Grunberg & Marc A. Stern eds., 1999).
61. E.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 469–70 (3d ed. 2000).

1716

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1693

rejected—the owner of the patent held Blackberry up for ransom: it
62
had to pay over $600 million to keep operating. It had originally
demanded that if the patent was overturned, it get back part of that
money, but the owner of the patent insisted that the amounts be
unconditional.63
Moreover, the legal system can lead to unfair outcomes. The high
costs of implementing IPR, including the high costs of challenging
patents, put developing countries at a disadvantage, exacerbating the
risks of biopiracy. The advocates of the patents often argue that one
should not worry about biopiracy, because the patents will not
survive. Even if that conclusion were true (which does not appear to
be the case), it is very expensive to challenge these patents. India is
large enough and well enough off that it can afford challenging them,
but Ecuador does not have the necessary resources.
Even in the cases in which a patent has been successfully
challenged in some courts, other courts have not been swayed. This is
illustrated by another famous example of biopiracy, entailing a
variety of uses of the neem tree oil, which is used in India for a wide
range of purposes. The United States and several European countries
granted a number of patents for some of these uses, even though they
had been known in India for a long time. In Europe, they were
challenged, and the challenge was sustained—that is to say, the
patents were overturned—but the United States refused to overturn
the patents. Thus, the neem oil patents continue to be enforced in the
United States even though in another jurisdiction they have been
overturned.64
One of the most vocal complaints against the TRIPS agreement
that I mentioned earlier was that it reduces access to generic

62. See Susan Decker & Rebecca Barr, BlackBerry Patent Settlement Frees RIM to Head
Off Rivals, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 6, 2006, at 16.
63. There are alternatives to a system in which patent owners can so severely restrict access
to their innovations. For instance, under the “liability system,” those who use someone else’s
intellectual property have to pay compensation; but the owner of the intellectual property
cannot exclude someone from using the property. Even more modest reforms, such as allowing
the use of intellectual property so long as there is a challenge (with appropriate compensation
paid if the patent is upheld) would be preferable. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids
Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2442–48 (1994); Carl
Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution 33–35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 13141, 2007), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13141.
64. See Vandana Shiva & Ruth Brand, The Fight Against Patents on the Neem Tree, in
LIMITS TO PRIVATIZATION: HOW TO AVOID TOO MUCH OF A GOOD THING 51, 52–54 (Ernet
Ulrich von Weizsäcker, Oran R. Young & Matthias Finger eds., 2005).
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65
medicines. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has its own
vocabulary, called “flexibilities,” that allow countries to issue
compulsory licenses for generic medicines.66 The head of the WTO
has been upset at my public criticisms of TRIPS, especially in those
lectures in which I explain how the WTO is causing people to die
because without access to generic medicines, the poor in developing
countries suffering from life threatening diseases simply cannot afford
to pay the “brand name” prices. He wrote me to remind me that I was
forgetting about the flexibilities. But he is forgetting about the
inflexibilities in these flexibilities. They are designed to make it
difficult to issue compulsory licenses even for life saving generic
medicines. If the WTO really were interested in making sure people
had access to generic medicines, the set of procedures would look
very different. There might, for instance, be a list of life saving drugs,
or drugs that addressed debilitating disease, in which any generic
producer could sell in any country whose income was below a critical
threshold. Even better would be the reverse presumption: any generic
producer could sell any drug in any country whose income was below
a critical threshold unless the owner of the patent substantiated that it
was a lifestyle drug, of little value in addressing either life-threatening
or debilitating diseases.
As it is, not only do the rules make it difficult for developing
countries to get access to these vital medicines at prices that they can
afford, but the United States exacerbates the problem by coming
down hard on any country that attempts to use a compulsory license.
The United States threatens to take all kinds of other actions (and
there are a variety of actions that are costly to a developing country
going against its wishes), even when the country is complying with all
the rules of TRIPS. So, it is not just how the rules were designed but
also the way they are being implemented that has made it more
difficult to get access to these generic medicines.67

65. See supra Part I.A.1.
66. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/Engl
ish/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf (recognizing the “flexibilities” of the TRIPS
agreement).
67. The provisions on data exclusivity which have been included in many of the bilateral
trade agreements that the United States has signed have also exacerbated the problem of access
to generic medicines. Even if a compulsory license is issued, there is an attempt to restrict the
use of data that might be required to establish the safety and efficacy of the generic drug.
Although there are changes to the regulatory structures that might allow developing countries
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Reduced access to generic medicines is one of the most
important and most visible concerns of the developing countries, but
there are a whole set of other concerns. One of the complaints of the
developing countries is that although they are being forced to pay
high prices for brand name drugs, the current system provides little
incentive for research and development on the diseases that afflict
them. I mentioned that the drug companies are spending more money
on marketing and advertising than on research, and more money for
research on lifestyle drugs than on lifesaving drugs.68 Almost all the
money that they spend on lifesaving drugs goes toward diseases
prevalent in advanced industrial countries, which is predictable. One
of the problems of being poor is that you do not have any money and
therefore cannot spend a lot of money on drugs, even though if you
do not buy the drugs you may die. There is clearly a strong potential
demand for these drugs from poor countries, but the poor do not
have the income to convert this potential demand into a real demand.
The drug companies, of course, realize this; some of them have been
very upfront about it. They admit that the patent system does not
provide incentives for developing cures or vaccines for the diseases
that afflict the poor, especially the poor in developing countries. The
World Health Organization has finally also recognized that the
intellectual property regime is not addressing these concerns of the
developing countries.69
The other concern, which I mentioned earlier, is the gap in
knowledge that separates the developing and developed countries:
TRIPS has made it more difficult to close that gap. More broadly,
even advocates of free trade, like Jagdish Bhagwati, argue that TRIPS
70
should never have been part of the WTO. At the same time, as I
have already made clear, TRIPS provides little protection for the

to circumvent the restrictive impact—for example, simply by requiring generic producers to
show the bio-equivalence of their product to products that have been shown to be safe and
efficacious in the United States or Europe—developing countries appear to be under pressure
not to make the necessary regulatory changes.
68. See supra Part II.A.
69. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH (2006), available at http://www.who.int/intellectual
property/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf.
70. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Don’t Cry for Cancún, 83 FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004, at
52, 56–57 (“Intellectual property protection is a matter of collecting royalties, and including
them in a trade institution such as the WTO seriously distorted what the organization should
accomplish.”).
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intellectual property of developing countries. It is not just an issue of
biopiracy but also protection of biodiversity. This is not, of course,
just a matter of TRIPS, but also of the Biodiversity Convention—the
United States has refused to sign the convention that was intended to
provide some protection for their biodiversity largely because the
drug companies do not want to pay for the use of genetic materials
obtained from developing countries.
Given all of these problems, it is not surprising that the
developing countries have called for a development-oriented
intellectual property regime, which I mentioned earlier. It should be
clear that there is no reason to expect that the design of an IPR
system, which balances costs and benefits of intellectual property
protection, that is optimal for the United States would also be optimal
for developing countries. The developing countries are, as a result,
calling for a more balanced intellectual property regime, one that
reflects the costs and benefits to their economies.
B. Prizes
One alternative to the patent system is called the prize system.
This entails giving a prize to whoever comes up with an innovation, or
at least those innovations that meet announced objectives. For
instance, the person who finds a cure or a vaccine for AIDS or for
malaria would get a big prize. If a person comes up with a drug with
slightly different side effects than existing drugs (but which is
otherwise no more effective) he or she might get a small prize. In
other words, the size of the prize would be calibrated by the
magnitude of the contribution.
This idea is actually an old one. The Royal Society of Arts and
Technology have been advocating and even using prizes to incentivize
the development of needed technologies for some two centuries. For
instance, they thought it was important to come up with an alternative
to chimney sweeps; small, underfed boys used to be sent down
chimneys. It was not good for the health of these young boys and not
a socially desirable way of cleaning chimneys; but not cleaning
chimneys meant increasing the risk of fire, with serious consequences.
Thus, the Royal Society offered a prize to anybody who invented a
mechanical way of cleaning chimneys. The prize provided an
incentive, and it worked. A patent system might also have motivated
the development of a mechanical device (though it did not), but if it
had, there might have been a problem. The owner of the patent might
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have been tempted to attempt to maximize the return to his
innovation by charging a high fee for its use. That might mean that
only rich families could afford to use the mechanical device, and
young boys’ lives would have continued to be put at risk.
There are a whole host of other things for which they have
offered prizes.
The current patent system is, of course, similar to a prize system,
but it is a very inefficient one, because the “prize” is a grant of
monopoly power, and with monopoly power there are incentives to
restrict the use of the knowledge. One of the characteristics of a
desirable innovation system is that the ideas and innovations, once
developed, be widely used and disseminated, but the patent system is
designed to restrict the use of knowledge. The alternative is to use the
competitive market to ensure efficient dissemination; giving a license
to a large number of people uses the force of competition to drive
down the price and to increase the usage of the knowledge. In both
cases, market forces are used: one is the incentive of a monopoly to
restrict knowledge and raise prices, the other is the market force of
competitive markets to drive down prices and extend the benefit of
knowledge widely.
Moreover, the prize system has the advantage that there is less
incentive to waste money on advertising and to engage in other
anticompetitive behaviors designed to enhance monopoly profits. I
mentioned that the drug companies spend more on advertising and
marketing than they do on research. These marketing expenditures
are designed to reduce the elasticity of demand, which allows the
owner of the patent to raise prices and increase monopoly profits.
From a social point of view these expenditures are totally dissipative.
There is today a widespread recognition that drug companies
have insufficient incentives to develop medicines for the diseases that
afflict the poor, simply because there is no money in those drugs. One
of the widely discussed ideas for addressing this problem is a
guaranteed purchase fund, where the World Bank or the Gates
Foundation would guarantee one or two billion dollars to someone
who discovers (and patents) a vaccine or a cure for AIDS or malaria
or some other disease afflicting the developing world for the purchase
of the drug. In effect, there would be a guaranteed market. The
guarantee of purchasing one or two billion dollars of the drug would
act like a prize, and a sufficiently large guarantee would motivate
research. These guaranteed purchase funds, however, would still
maintain the inefficiency of the monopoly patent system. The
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discoverer receives his “prize”—the monopoly profits—by charging
monopoly prices. The poor who get the drugs through the guaranteed
purchase fund do not, of course, pay the monopoly price. But the
funds are limited. When the funds are used up, a government that
wants to provide to its citizens, say, the malaria medicine that has
been incentivized through the guaranteed purchase fund will have to
pay the full monopoly price. Money spent to purchase this drug at the
monopoly price is money that cannot be spent on the country’s other
health needs. It is a transfer payment to the monopolist, beyond what
the monopolist may have needed to undertake the research. It is far
better to use the money for the guaranteed purchase fund to offer a
prize, or to buy the patent, and make it available freely (or to anyone
willing to pay a limited licensing fee). In short, in areas where there
are well-defined needs (such as the need to develop a malaria
vaccine) both the prize system and the patent system can provide
comparable incentives to undertake research. Both have as an
advantage over government-funded research that no one has to pick
who should undertake the research: there is a process of selfselection; those who think that they have the best prospects of
succeeding (and are able to finance the research and willing to bear
the risk) undertake the project. But the prize system uses the force of
competitive markets to ensure the widespread dissemination of the
benefits of the innovation; the patent system uses monopoly power,
restricting the usage, and often distorting the markets in other ways.
C. A Portfolio Approach to Innovation
Intellectual Property rights should be part of an innovation
system that also includes prizes and government-supported research
and grants (which are probably the most important component of the
innovation system, in supporting basic research). Each of these has its
strengths and weaknesses. Table 1 provides a chart of some of the
attributes of these three alternatives. We should have a portfolio of
instruments, but, in my view, in the current portfolio, too much
weight has been assigned to patents.
The first attribute I list is selection. One problem facing any
innovation system is how to select those to engage in a research
project. The advantage of both the patent and the prize system is that
they are decentralized and based on self-selection. Those who think
that they are the best researchers make the decision to undertake the
research. They make the investment, risking their own money, in the
belief that they have a good chance of winning the prize (the formal
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prize, or the prize of the patent). The prize and patent systems have
this advantage over the government-funded research, where there is a
group of peers (or bureaucrats), deciding who is the best researcher.
There is obviously, in addition, a concern about “capture” of the
research-awarding process, for example by political interests whose
agenda may not be the advancement of science and technology.
Table 1. Comparing Alternative Systems
Innovation System
GovernmentFunded Research

Attribute

Patent

Prize

Selection

Decentralized,
self-selection.

Decentralized,
self-selection.

Bureaucratic.

Lacks
coordination.

Lacks
coordination.

More coordination
possible.

Finance (tax)

Highly
distortionary and
inequitable.

Can be less
distortionary and
more equitable.

Most efficient.

Dissemination
Incentive

Limited—
monopoly.

Strong—
competitive
markets.

Strong.

Risk

Litigation risk.

Less risk.

Least risk.

Innovation
Incentives

Strong but
distorted.

Strong, less
distorted.

Strong nonmonetary
incentives.

Requires welldefined
objectives.
Transaction
Costs

High.

Lower.

Lower.

On the other hand, one of the disadvantages of both the patent
and the prize system is the lack of coordination. From a societal point
71
of view, there is the risk of excessive duplication. The lack of
coordination increases the cost of doing research. One of the risks
that each researcher faces is that he does not know how many other
people are engaged in that research. That increases the risk someone
else will get the patent or prize first. Those engaged in research may
demand increased returns to compensate them for the increased risk;

71. I say “excessive” because it may in fact be optimal to have several independent, parallel
research efforts.
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in effect, the lack of coordination discourages innovation. The
government-funded research can be more coordinated.
In regards to finance, the patent system is the worst of the three
systems. It is highly distortionary and inequitable in the way funds to
support research are raised—by charging monopoly prices, for
example, on the sick. By the same token, the transactions costs
(especially those associated with litigation) and the distortions in the
economic system are much higher with a patent system than with the
other two.
In particular, with respect to the dissemination of knowledge and
its efficient use, government-funded research is best (because
knowledge is generally made freely available); the prize system is
second (though there may be little difference with governmentfunded research if, after the prize is awarded, knowledge is made
freely available, or, if, with government-funded research, the
government charges a licensing fee); and the patent system is the
worst, given that it relies on monopolization, which entails high prices
and restricted usage. In short, under the prize and the governmentfunded research systems, knowledge, once acquired, is more
efficiently used. These are among the key advantages of these
alternatives.
There is a very big difference in the nature of the risk faced by
researchers in the three systems (besides the risks arising from lack of
coordination, just discussed). In terms of risk, the patent system is the
worst because of the huge amounts of litigation risk. The government
is the best because it has the advantages of paying for the input rather
than the output. That is to say, a researcher gets money for his time
and other resources spent doing the research whereas in the prize and
the patent system researchers only get money if their research is
successful—and successful before their rivals.
The reason that risk is important is that in equilibrium consumers
72
have to pay for the risk borne by researchers. People and firms are

72. The evidence is that capital markets do not fully spread risks faced by firms, because of
imperfections of information. E.g., Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Asymmetric
Information and the New Theory of the Firm: Financial Constraints and Risk Behavior, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 160 (1990) (discussing the effect of information imperfections on firm behavior and
arguing that informational problems in the capital market cause firms to act in a risk-averse
manner). There is also considerable empirical evidence that markets do not efficiently distribute
risk, that is firms act in a risk averse manner, even to risks which are uncorrelated with the
market. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Ownership, Control and Efficient Markets: Some Paradoxes
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risk averse, and if they have to bear risk, they have to be
compensated for doing so. The patent system makes society bear the
cost of that risk in an inefficient way. Under the government financed
research system, the risk is shared by society in a more efficient way.
The innovation incentives are strong in the patent system, but
73
they are distorted, whereas the prize system can provide
equivalently strong incentives that are less distorted.
On most accounts, the prize system dominates the patent system;
but the prize system has one limitation: it cannot work when the
objective is not well defined. That is why the prize system will never
replace the patent system. At the same time, in basic research—the
foundation on which everything else is built—government-funded
research will continue to remain at the core of the innovation system.
No one has proposed otherwise: the costs of restricting the usage of
knowledge associated with the patent system far outweigh any
purported benefits. The debate today revolves only around applied
research, which often entails translating the knowledge acquired in
basic research into applications.
CONCLUSION
Intellectual Property Rights are important, but the importance of
IPR has been exaggerated, as they form only one part of our
innovation system. IPR should be seen as part of a portfolio of
instruments. We need to strengthen the other elements of this
portfolio and redesign our intellectual property regime to increase its
benefits and reduce its costs. Doing so will increase the efficiency of
our economy—and most likely even increase the pace of innovation.

in the Theory of Capital Markets, in ECONOMIC REGULATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JAMES R.
NELSON 311, 321 (Kenneth D. Boyer & William G. Shepherd eds., 1982).
73. They are distorted, as I have noted, because there are incentives to engage in research
to innovate around a patent, and to spend money in ways that extend the effective life of the
patent. These innovation distortions are in addition to the other market distortions, for example
associated with expenditures attempting to make demand curves less elastic.

